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In Wolfgang Maennig and Andrew Zimbalist, eds., Handbook on the Economics of Mega-
Sporting Events, Edward Elgar (March 2012). 
Chapter 4 
 
THE WINNER’S CURSE: 
Why is the cost of sports mega-events so often underestimated? 
 
Wladimir Andreff 
1
 
 
Grenoble taxpayers were not very happy to pay local taxes up to 1992 for covering the 
financial deficit from the 1968 Winter Games! The 1976 Summer Olympics in Montreal 
outperformed Grenoble Winter Olympics in terms of deficit: the latter was so deep that 
Montreal taxpayers had been repaying the debt until 2006, for thirty years. After Montreal's 
financial mess, the number of candidate cities wishing to host such sports mega-events 
dropped, and since the 1984 Games in Los Angeles the watchword of local Olympics 
organizing committees (LOOC) and the IOC became “the Games will pay for the Games”. 
Such watchword was incentive enough to trigger a new increase in the number of candidates 
to host the Olympics but not enough to cure the financial mess disease. After having claimed 
for seven years that the Games will pay for the Games, the 1992 Winter Olympics in 
Albertville  resulted in a  $ 60 million deficit
2
. Were those three exceptions proving the rule 
that sport mega-events usually are organised at a reasonable and correctly anticipated cost? 
Unfortunately it is not so.  
In the same vein, when the 2012 Summer Games had been allocated to London in July 2005, 
the expected and advertised cost was in the range of £ 2.4 billion.  By the end of 2008, the 
cost estimates ranged from £ 9.4 billion to £12 billion. Some press articles have suggested that 
the promoters of London candidature had deliberately underestimated the Olympics bill in 
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 To the best of our knowledge, Albertville Games were the only circumstance in which ex ante economic impact 
study had dared to predict that they will end up in the red (Andreff, 1991). Such ex ante warning is rather seldom 
in the literature. Let us imagine what might have happened to a consultant who would have delivered to the 
mayor of London a pre-2005 study concluding with “give up your candidature to the 2012 Games, it is too much 
expensive”! 
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order to get the Games. In particular, the London candidature file had intentionally 
underestimated the overall cost in neglecting to account for the VAT, the Paralympics budget 
and a part of security expenditures. London 2012 promoters of course were neither talking 
about nor expecting the further creation of a new fund in 2008 to cover the rising cost of the 
Games. There is an impression that having won a harsh struggle in bidding primarily over 
Paris 2012, London, its authorities, inhabitants and taxpayers are now cursed despite a nice 
study based on a contingent valuation method which found a positive willingness to pay for 
hosting the Olympics of non London residents – located in the Bath region (Walton et al., 
2008). As to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the city was awarded the Games in June 2007, 
exhibiting a $ 8.5 billion budget. Since then the budget has skyrocketed. In August 2010, it 
had already reached $ 33 billion – a more than three fold increase within three years, with an 
amount that is bigger than the reported cumulative cost of Winter Olympics in Nagano 1998, 
Salt Lake City 2002 and Turin 2006 taken together.  
The aforementioned facts raise three long lasting questions to those cities (countries) which 
apply to host sports mega-events. Why the actual ex post costs of hosting an event are 
predictably much larger than the ex ante estimated and expected costs? Consequently, why do 
the promising prospects exhibited in an economic impact study or a cost-benefit analysis 
during the candidature usually vanish before the opening ceremony? And thus, why the initial 
euphoria of an Olympics (or other sports mega-event) bid is followed up with a post-bid 
curse, post-Olympics disillusion and a substantial bill for the taxpayers of the host city? 
Politicians – city mayors, sports ministers, presidents of the Republic, etc. – do respond to 
these questions with making tabula rasa of the past: previous sports mega-events may have 
shown unexpected extra-costs but our candidature is based on a sound economic evaluation 
and will not be disappointing in any respect. The success story is to come. Most economists 
are much more sceptical and criticize analytical flaws and methodological tricks that are 
usually found in economic impact studies and cost-benefit analyses of sporting events. But no 
one asks why such tricks and flaws are repeatedly reproduced after so many years of 
academic criticisms published about them. Our contention is that ex ante benefit 
overestimation and more basically cost underestimation are deeply rooted in auctioning the 
allocation of sports mega-events which so often evolves into a so-called winner‟s curse - or 
the misfortune of winning a bidding war. The focus here is on the Summer and Winter 
Olympics, but the background idea is that the same analysis must be relevant for many sports 
mega-events which are allocated through an auction as soon as the number of bidders is 
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bigger than one, such as FIFA's soccer World Cup
3
, the Rugby World Cup or UEFA's soccer 
Euro. The hypothesis of a winner‟s curse has not yet been examined in such a context though 
it is sometimes referred to (Leeds and von Allmen, 2002) or further analyzed (Swindell and 
Rosentraub, 2002) with regards to cities bidding to host professional team franchises in North 
American team sports leagues.  
In view of validating the winner‟s curse assumption, the chapter starts with a brief overview 
of the candidature puzzle (Section 1). Then three analytical variants of the winner‟s curse are 
presented (Section 2) in order to  adopt the one which best fits with the Olympics centralized 
monopolist allocation process based on auctioning in a context of asymmetrical information 
(Section 3). From this pioneering analysis are derived a few indicators that can detect a 
winner‟s curse dwelling upon its major expected outcomes (Section 4). Finally, a preliminary 
attempt to verify the winner‟s curse hypothesis with such indices is undertaken for the 
Summer Olympics from 1972 to 2012 and Winter Olympics from 1980 to 2014 (Section 5). 
The conclusion recommends a halt in bidding for the Games, an alternative being to fix an 
Olympics site once and for all.  
 
1. Bidding for sports mega-events: the candidature jigsaw puzzle 
 
The cradle of the winner‟s curse, if any, lies in bidding to obtain the Olympics, which means 
that the roots of the curse emerge during a precise span of time. First, it must be identified. 
Let us define the overall sequencing of an Olympiad as follows. In t-3, a city considers the 
opportunity to participate into bidding for the next Olympics. In t-2, it starts preparing and 
promoting its candidature in order to have its application ready in due time for the bid (the 
IOC votes). In t-1, the IOC votes determine the winner which will host the Games. Let us date 
t the day of the Olympics opening ceremony and t+1 the day of the closing ceremony. 
Further, assume a  post-Olympics economic recession, following  growth between t-1 and 
t+1,  occurs up to a date t+2. Let us fix t+3 as the date when all economic and social effects 
of the Games end up – taxpayers have finished to repay the debt if any, residents have 
benefited from sporting and non sporting infrastructures built up for the Games as well as 
from positive intangible effects such as feel good, image and reputation satisfactions. 
Therefore: t-3 to t-2 is a preparation stage to a city's candidature; a simplifying assumption is 
                                                 
3
 Allmers and Maennig (2009) have already shown that significant net economic benefits cannot be identified for 
FIFA World Cups in France 1998 and Germany 2006. More in tune with the winner‟s curse hypothesis, total 
investment of $1.35 billion in stadiums for the World Cup 2010 in South Africa  was much higher than the $105 
million initially budgeted at the time of the tournament bid in 2004 (du Plessis and Maennig, 2009).  
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adopted, i.e. this stage does not involve any cost even though some preliminary study may be 
achieved. 
t-2 to t-1 is a candidature stage; ex ante potential or expected costs are assessed and 
eventually described in the city application file submitted to the  country's OC (Olympic 
Committee) and, then, the IOC in t-1. This stage is usually six to seven years. It is the stage 
during which the winner‟s curse emerges, if any, in the form of an ex ante underestimated 
potential cost ct-1. A bidding city usually commands and finances at least one ex ante study 
regarding the economic impact of hosting the Olympics. Since the cost of such a study is 
diminutive
4
 compared to the expected overall cost of organisation, sporting and non- sporting 
infrastructural investments contained in ct-1, it is neglected in the analysis below. 
t-1 to t is an investment stage both in organisation and (sporting and non-sporting) 
construction. During this stage the real cost of hosting the Games materialises into an ex post 
actual cost in t that is Ct which may or may not differ, from ct-1. Both ex ante expected and ex 
post actual costs are to be taken into account when it comes to identify a possible winner‟s 
curse. 
t to t+1 is a Games unfolding stage which reaches a peak in direct tangible revenues accruing 
to the LOOC and also a peak of the Olympics economic boom, including sometimes some 
unexpected extra costs at the very last minute. 
t+1 to t+2 is the span of time of post-Olympics recession when local economic activity is 
slowing down for some months up to one year or so, despite  the possibility of modest post-
Olympics revenues  and intangible social costs and benefits. 
t+2 to t+3 is a longer period of time along which all medium and long-term tangible (paying 
the debt, using and maintaining sporting and non-sporting facilities) and intangible (local 
population satisfaction, improved image of the host city, better social cohesion, various social 
costs and benefits) effects come to an end
5
.  
If some supplementary information happens to be published about ex post costs after t, it must 
be picked up for the assessment of a possible winner‟s curse. 
Nearly all bidding cities hire a consulting company or research centre to carry out an ex ante 
economic impact study or an ex ante cost-benefit analysis, usually a contingent valuation at 
this stage. The projected costs and revenues from the Games are a requisite part of the 
application file remitted to the IOC. A glance at the existing literature demonstrates that ex 
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post economic impact and cost-benefit analyses are substantially fewer than ex ante studies. 
Host cities generally do not commission an ex post evaluation of the actual costs, revenues 
and benefits that could reveal too many differences between initial costs-benefits and the ex 
post reality. Thus, the few existing ex post studies are mainly due to academic research. There 
is a good reason for that. When, for the same sport mega-event, there are both ex ante and  ex 
post studies, the latter exhibits a disappointing economic outcome. One of the rare events for 
which one can compare ex ante economic impact study commissioned by the organisation 
committee (ESSEC, 2007) to ex post economic impact study and cost-benefit analysis with a 
rigorous methodology (Barget and Gouguet, 2010) is the 2007 Rugby World Cup in France. 
The results are: 
Ex ante economic impact: € 8 billion. 
Ex post economic impact: € 539 million. 
Ex post net social benefit (social benefits minus social costs): € 113 million. 
The aim here is not to discuss the analytical flaws and methodological tricks of economic 
impact studies and cost-benefit analyses. Most economists do not trust the former and prefer 
the latter though with some reservations (Baade and Matheson, 2001; Barget and Gouguet, 
2010; Crompton, 1995; Johnson et al., 2001; Hudson, 2001; Késenne, 2005; Matheson, 2009; 
Porter, 1999; Walker and Mondello, 2007). They raise serious doubts about the excessively 
optimistic estimates of the ex ante studies. Scepticism is widespread among academic 
economists who are used to cut down with more rigorous methods the anticipated net benefits 
exhibited in studies doomed to be utilised by bidding cities for the purpose of announcement 
and promotion of their candidature. However, no one economist has analysed so far why such 
overestimation of positive sports mega-events economic impact, including their ex ante cost 
underestimation, is so systematically reproduced from one bidding city to the other, and from 
one Olympiad to the next one. This is due to a missing relationship that economists have not 
yet established between economic impact studies underestimating the costs and 
overestimating the benefits, on the one hand, and the need for a city to outbid other bidding 
cities, on the other hand,, i.e. to ex ante exhibit the biggest expected economic impact or net 
social benefit, and afterwards to be plagued with a winner‟s curse. 
Moreover, the sceptical assessments of professional economists remain unheeded, or even 
unheard, by decision makers and city authorities who repeatedly commission ex ante 
economic impact studies, in particular between t-2 and t-1. All city mayors and candidature 
promoters of bidding cities are very much eager to obtain a study exhibiting a positive 
economic impact derived from hosting the targeted sports events, and are ready to pay a 
 6 
significant amount of money (to a prestigious consultant) for getting such conclusion.  
Cognizant of this purpose, consulting companies  obligingly deliver impact studies which  
exaggerate positive economic spillover since providing a conclusion that predicts fantastic 
economic impact is a precondition to be selected in the future as a consultant by other cities or 
countries applying as potential hosts for some sports event.  
Thus, when focusing on methodological weaknesses of economic impact studies, most 
economists touch a really sensitive issue. However, they do not perceive that methodological 
shortcomings are there on purpose, to support and embellish the application file of a bidding 
city. Cost underestimation and benefit overestimation are embedded in the process of bidding 
for the Olympics, and this guarantees that ex ante expected costs will be higher than ex post 
actual costs (and anticipated benefits higher than the real ones). In some sense, wrong (i.e. 
overestimating) economic impact studies are a launching pad for the winner‟s curse. This is 
the reason why comparing costs publicised during or at the end of the candidature stage with 
actual organisation and investment costs at the end of the investment stage or later, is crucial 
to check the very existence of a winner‟s curse and, by the same token, the fallacy of nearly 
all ex ante economic impact studies delivered to cities bidding for a sports event.  
Are ex ante impact studies and cost-benefit analyses really needed or useful, a relevant 
question correctly raised by Baade, Késenne, Matheson and others? One may have some 
doubts since the result is known in advance: an underestimated initial cost of hosting the 
sports event and, consequently, a cost overrun ending with an extra cost to be paid by 
taxpayers whatever their willingness to pay which has been expressed ex ante. Our point here 
is not to assess the accuracy of ex ante studies. Nevertheless, should they have sometimes 
forecast ex ante negative or nil economic impact then we would not have suspected them to 
be so much involved in the generation of a winner‟s curse.  
Three last dimensions of the candidature puzzle must be mentioned. First, there is difficulty in 
explaining with standard econometric models which are the determinants of bidding success 
for Olympic Games. Feddersen et al. (2008)
6
 have attempted to do so for Summer Games 
between 1992 and 2012 with a model comprising seventeen variables that should likely be 
considered before the IOC votes --    the distance of sporting venues from the Olympic 
village, local weather and unemployment being the most significant variables. The outcome is 
interesting and, at first sight, surprising. The model correctly predicts the IOC decision for 
100% of failed bids. In contrast, it correctly explains only 50% of successful bids.  Feddersen 
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et al. include no variable that represents the cost of the Games as publicised by bidding cities. 
Excluding cost from the model is probably a good econometric choice since cost must not be 
a priority variable in IOC votes. However, if cost is unheeded as a IOC decision criterion, the 
probability that a successful bidder will be cursed and pay the price for that during the 
investment stage of the Olympiad is extremely high.  
Second, it is not always the least expensive Olympics project which is voted for by IOC 
members. For instance, Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott (2008) carefully checked that IOC 
votes had been several times an entire surprise since it was not the best quality candidature 
file that had been selected; they openly mention the 1996 and 2012 Summer Olympics and the 
1998, 2006 and 2014 Winter Olympics
7
. Does this mean that IOC voters do not care about the 
cost of the Games while bidding cities are very much concerned about it? If so, a winner‟s 
curse may be rooted in such an attitude asymmetry.  
A third dimension of the candidature puzzle goes in line with the previous argument. It is very 
often the bidding city with the highest organisation and/or investment cost that is eventually 
successful. Table 1 reinforces such assumption with the 2012 and 2016 Summer Olympics. 
Both London and Rio de Janeiro had exhibited the highest investment and overall cost in their 
bids. 
 
Table 1: Ex ante cost: comparison between cities bidding for the 
Olympics 
 
    
2012 Summer Olympics: announced costs   
New York London Madrid Paris 
Overall: 10,68M$ Overall: 18,25M$ Overall: 3,64M$ Overall: 8,87M$ 
Investment:7,59M$ Investment.:15,79M$ Investment:1,64M$ Investment:6,21M$ 
Operation: 3,09M$ Operation: 2,46M$ Operation: 2M$ Operation: 2,66M$ 
Moscow    
Overall: 11,86M$    
Investment:10,07M$    
Operation: 1,79M$    
2016 Summer Olympics: announced costs   
Chicago Tokyo Madrid Rio de Janeiro 
Overall: 3,3M$ Overall: 4,07M$ Overall: 4,18M$ Overall: 9,53M$ 
Investment: 2,6M$ Investment:2,11M$ Investment: 2,35M$ Investment.:7,6M$ 
Operation: 0,7M$ Operation: 1,96M$ Operation: 1,83M$ Operation: 1,93M$ 
Sources: bidding committees.   
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2. Three variants of the winner’s curse 
 
According to those sports economists who explicitly refer to the winner‟s curse, the latter is 
defined as “the tendency of a winning bid to be in excess of the real value of the asset sold in 
the auction” (Sandy et al., 2004, p. 309) or, phrased differently, “since the most optimistic 
among the potential bidders makes the winning bid, there is a good chance that the actual 
revenues (…) will be less than that bidder anticipated” (Ibid., p. 131).  Note that here the 
winner‟s curse is merely understood as the result of bidders' behavior, it is comprehended 
only as a demand side triggered mechanism. No specific mention is made of the supply side 
except saying that it is a monopoly, like the IOC or FIFA for instance. Leeds and von Allmen 
(2002, p. 160) add: “Economists call this paradox – in which the „winning‟ city is actually 
worse off than it would have been had it lost the bid – the winner‟s curse.” One implication 
from these definitions is that, on the demand side for an auctioned asset, there must be more 
than one bidder for the winner‟s curse to emerge.  
Sports economists have less emphasized the supply side aspect: is there any specific strategy 
and, derived from it, issues of monopolist organisations such as the IOC, FIFA, UEFA, etc., 
that could influence the auction in such a way as to come out with a winner‟s curse? One 
objective of this chapter is to respond this question as well. Joining the demand side and 
supply side dimensions, one reaches analytical problems like bilateral monopoly
8
 or moral 
hazard and adverse selection issues in a relationship between one monopoly and several 
bidders; such issues are related to information asymmetry in principal-agent theory. Since 
usually more than one city is bidding for the next Olympics, the latter framework is the 
relevant one all the more that the IOC is, to some extent, a centralised and private bureaucracy 
at a global level. Although there are strong rivalries across its members (decision makers, 
voters), this organisation is not operating, properly speaking, on a competitive supply side 
market for the Olympics. The IOC does not sell its exclusive sports event in a genuine market 
where a fully-fledged market mechanism determines an equilibrium price.  
From the very beginning, the winner‟s curse had been imported into sports economics from 
the auction theory where it was born in 1971 in Western economics literature. In fact, the 
winner‟s curse was well known even earlier in centrally planned economies (CPEs) because it 
was the everyday life of centralised allocation of inputs and state finance.  
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power) of the two bilateral monopolists (the IOC and the single bidding city).  
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 2.1. The winner‟s curse: “you have won the bid and will lose money” 
 
The winner‟s curse hypothesis was first advanced by Capen et al. (1971) to explain the low 
returns on investments to companies engaged in competitive bidding for oil and gas leases. 
The impression was that winning bidders had paid a too high price for oil and gas leases 
(Gilley et al., 1986); they had been cursed. In other words, they had paid an auction price 
higher than any likely market price and had undertaken too high a cost to be recouped by the 
revenues of their investment in oil and gas exploitation. Similarly, Gilberto and Varaiya 
(1989) have provided evidence of a winner‟s curse to explain large takeover premiums in 
auctions for failed banks, in sharp contrast to the orthodox view endorsed by the mainstream 
finance literature.  
In all such circumstances, it was noted that in any auction-type setting, where the value of the 
auctioned object is uncertain but will turn out to be the same for all bidders, the party that 
overestimates the value of the object is likely to outbid its competitors and win the contest. 
The items won, however, are more often than not those whose value has been overestimated. 
Auction winners who fail to recognize this possibility are likely to be cursed by having paid 
more for an item than its true value. Thus, there is adverse selection in this outcome. The 
bidding process results in winning bids that produce below normal or even negative returns 
contrary to all that is learned from the theory of rational investment decision. Thaler (1994) 
stresses the asymmetric information across bidders, which leads to an extreme form of the 
winner‟s curse in which any positive bid yields an expected financial loss to the bidder. An 
increase in the number of other bidders implies that to win the auction you must bid more 
aggressively. Yet the presence of more bidders also increases the chance that if you win, you 
will have overestimated the value of the object for sale – suggesting that you should bid less 
aggressively.  
A parallel can be drawn here with allocation of the Olympics through an auction bid. The 
IOC, when calling cities to bid and fixing a deadline for the submission of candidature files, is 
in a situation that compares with a state or a region calling companies to bid for oil and gas 
leases. No one a priori knows the real market value of being selected as the next Olympics 
host city, not even the IOC. What the IOC looks for is to find a city eager to host the Games 
and organise them in the best way (i.e., the ex ante supposedly best project). Thus, the IOC is 
interested in eliciting aggressive bidding to get the "best" project because it will benefit from 
the resulting winner‟s curse. Bidding cities are exactly in the conditions that Thaler points at: 
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if they want to have a chance to get the Games, they definitely must overbid other bidders 
until the date
9
 of allocation (IOC members‟ vote).  Assuming that the IOC is used to choose 
the best project from an economic point of view
10
, the winning city is absolutely cursed since 
it has promised to invest and pay too much to get the Olympics, while the IOC is going to 
obtain a grandiose  project for which  it will not pay the full price. It appears here, first, that 
the supply side also matters in the analysis of the winner‟s curse and, second, that adverse 
selection is likely to allocate the Games to the city applying with the most expensive project. 
The more a bidding city has underestimated the announced costs for hosting the Olympics, the 
more the winner‟s curse will materialise in ex post extra costs, and a possible financial deficit, 
and the more the IOC will have got a magnificent project without paying its full cost.  
 
 2.2. Being cursed on financial and second hand markets 
 
Forty years after the article by Capen et al., the literature about the winner‟s curse has grown 
for a very simple reason: the concept has found many applications in financial markets which 
now comprise the great bulk of the winner‟s curse literature (Kagel and Levin, 2002). In 
particular, it is utilised to explain the share value underestimation in initial public offerings 
and the positive initial returns earned by investors on new issued equities (Rock, 1986; Levis, 
1990). Though it is a widespread phenomenon, it has been under the spotlights during IPO‟s 
privatisation on new tiny stock exchanges in post-communist transition economies (Andreff, 
2000 & 2003). Overbidding is also present in different auction mechanisms such as sealed-bid 
auctions, English auctions, first-price auctions with insider information, blind-bid auctions, 
and bilateral bargaining games (the latter would apply to Olympics bids only if there is one 
single candidature). In the background, one finds sophisticated models and a lot of 
technicalities that would not be easy to transfer to analysing city bids for hosting the 
Olympics. 
The winner‟s curse issue has also been found in second hand markets, primarily on the market 
for „lemons‟ where the true value of the second hand car is uncertain and unknown to the 
purchasers (bidders) while hidden by the seller. Akerlof (1970) has demonstrated that with 
such information asymmetry the market will lead to adverse selection and the winning 
purchaser will be cursed. There is even an application of the winner‟s curse concept in sports 
                                                 
9
 The selection process of the host city has evolved in two steps, first across potential bidders of a same country, 
and then across “qualified” bidding cities of different countries. This does not change the likelihood of the 
winner‟s curse to emerge and probably increases the pressure on cities to bid even more aggressively.  
10
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labor markets wherein a veteran sells his services on the talent market. Cassing and Douglas 
(1980) have argued that with free agency teams will tend to acquire a biased set of players, 
those for whom the bidder has overpaid. Because of information asymmetries and uncertainty, 
bids by potential team owners will not always mirror the true worth of a player, but the team 
that values correctly has a poor chance of signing a player compared to a team that 
overestimates the player‟s value. The latter is cursed.  
Since the previous examples are not that close to an auction bid for hosting a sports mega-
event, the rest of the chapter does not follow this path.  
 
 2.3. The winner‟s curse in a context of centralised allocation of investment funds 
 
In central planning (CPE), every year investment funds were allocated across state-owned 
enterprises through an auction opened by the central state administration (central planning 
agency or industrial ministries). It was obviously not a market allocation but a call sent to 
enterprises to submit investment projects, the central authorities being supposed to finance the 
best projects. In Yugoslavia until 1956, the Federal Institute for Planning was auctioning 
investment funds every year, was collecting projects submitted by "self-managed" enterprises 
and eventually was supporting those investment projects which were deemed to be the most 
efficient and closest to central plan objectives (Neuberger, 1956). The national investment 
fund was allocated across those enterprises having provided the best projects. In the USSR, a 
national investment fund was distributed by Gosplan across industrial ministries whose job 
was to allocate their industry investment fund among the enterprises under their tutelage, 
according to some centralised "efficiency" criteria (Dyker, 1983). Those efficiency criteria 
used in the Soviet Union until the 1960s were absolutely debatable with regards to their 
economic rationale (Andreff, 1993). However, after economic reforms, the criteria for 
investment decision making came closer to those applied in public enterprises in market 
economies. In the latter, for each investment project k was calculated its discounted net 
benefit (its social profitability), that is:  
 

 


N
0t
t
ktkt
k
a1
CR
B         
where Rkt stands for all revenues derived from the investment over its life‟s length (from t = 0 
to N), Ckt stands for all investment costs (Ckt = C0 + Ct + Cft with C0 the initial investment 
cost, Ct the cost of all further annual investment „slices‟ in case of a pluri-annual investment, 
and Cft the operational cost of the equipment over its life‟s length) and a is the national 
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discount rate fixed by a central planner
11
. In the face of rival projects submitted by 
enterprises, industrial ministries normally should have stuck to two selection rules:  
1/ choose an investment project if, and only if Bk > 0, for any k; 
2/ choose investment project 1, then project 2, then project 3, etc., until the finance of the 
industry investment fund is exhausted if B1 > B2 > B3 > … > Bn. If the ministry investment 
fund could only afford to finance the first three projects, it would have allocated all its 
investment fund to the most socially profitable projects. Each enterprise, once obtained its 
own investment fund, was committed to include the selected investment project (including its 
costs and revenues) in its own annual plan and to compulsorily fulfil it. 
 However, in practice, investment fund allocation did not proceed exactly in such smooth and 
theoretical way due to a context of information asymmetry. Each enterprise director had a 
good knowledge about his/her enterprise's existing equipment, technology, production 
capacity, real costs, the skills and productivity of manpower and, therefore, the time required 
to achieve the new investment project with the allocated investment fund. In contrast, the 
industrial ministry (and of course the central planning agency) had only a blurred idea, or no 
idea at all, about the magnitude of enterprise inside managerial variables. In such context, in 
order to augment its chance to get some investment fund, each enterprise was very much 
eager not to reveal the true value of its inside managerial variables – information non 
transparency creating a moral hazard situation – and incited to “cheat”12 with regards to the 
reality of its investment costs and revenues, and the required completion duration of the 
investment project. It has been demonstrated that cheating on investment projects was rather 
the rule than exception in CPEs (Kornaï, 1980; Dyker, 1983; Andreff, 1993) in the form of: 
  Any enterprise was announcing an investment and operation cost ck for the project k 
sent to the ministry and not the actual cost Ck, with obviously ck < Ck, in order to 
augment its chance to get investment funds from the ministry. 
  Any enterprise was announcing a very optimistic – often absolutely unrealistic – 
completion duration for the project k; Soviet economies have remained forever famous 
due to their unfinished investment building sites resulting from unattainable 
completion durations. 
                                                 
11
 If Rkt were to include social indirect and non pecuniary benefits while Ckt were to include social indirect and 
non pecuniary costs, the investment choice would have relied on standard cost-benefit analysis. Soviet 
enterprises and planners did not mind such indirect and non pecuniary effects.  
12
 The verb “to cheat” is used to mean what is pointed at, in academic terms, as information bias, distorted 
information and/or information manipulation in the communication between enterprises and their tutelage 
authorities (industrial ministries).  
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  Any enterprise was anticipating overestimated revenue from the investment: rk > Rk, 
with rk the ex ante announced revenues and Rk the actually expected revenues.  
An obvious consequence of investment cost underestimation and investment revenue 
overestimation is that the social profitability of an investment project k sent by an enterprise 
to the ministry was quite higher than its real social profitability: bk > Bk. 
Since all enterprises had adopted such a strategic behaviour, central authorities and ministries 
were absolutely confused, when not entirely incapable to rationally make a decision about 
how and to whom to allocate the national investment fund. Facing a myriad of fabulous 
investment projects, ministries had a tendency to inflate the number of financed projects in the 
first year of five-year plan – overinvestment - which was generating a typical investment 
cycle in CPEs (Bauer, 1978) with quite fewer investment projects financed by the end of five-
year plan. Indeed, all the projects submitted to a ministry were unrealistic, exhibiting an 
extraordinary social profitability, unbelievably low costs and a very short span of time to be 
completed. Thus, the aforementioned decision rule 1 was eliminating not even one project. 
The rule 2 was eliminating projects that seemingly were the most extraordinary. In such a 
confused situation, adverse selection was the most common outcome and inefficient or low-
efficiency investment projects were financed, including after some bargaining, lobbying and 
bribery of the ministry‟s civil servants in charge of investment funds by enterprises.  
Enterprises ordinarily were more often cheating by underestimating costs and completion 
durations than overestimating investment revenues. Thus, basically consider only the costs to 
simplify the issue. Let us assume that during the auction, a ministry was receiving investment 
projects such as: 
c1 < c2 < c3 < … < ck < …< cn 
If it were choosing the first three, it might well have selected the least efficient or, at least it 
was not sure to have kept the three most efficient ones. If in reality all projects had exactly a 
same actual cost C*, it would have meant that c1 = C1 – C* was the investment project for 
which the ex ante cost announced by an enterprise was the most underestimated compared 
with its actual cost. It follows that c2 = C2 – C* was the second most underestimated project in 
terms of cost, and cn = Cn – C* was the project with the least underestimated cost. The latter 
was nevertheless the one which had no chance to be funded while the first projects 1, 2, and 3 
were the most likely to be financed by the ministry although being the most underestimated, 
i.e. the least feasible in terms of cost and completion duration. Adverse selection is obvious. 
Now, let us relax the assumption that all projects had a same actual cost C* but, instead, they 
had different costs. Then all ministry decision making would depend on the relationship 
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between actual costs and the announced costs c1 < c2 < c3 < … < ck < …< cn, that is, on the 
degree of cost underestimation specific to each investment project. Let us imagine that actual 
costs indeed were such as C1 < C2 < C3 < … < Ck < … < Cn. Then the risk of adverse 
selection is difficult to exactly assess but it is minimal. On the other hand, the risk of selecting 
inefficient investment projects was quite high if the actual costs C1, C2 and C3 were such that 
the real social net benefits were B1, B2 and B3 < 0, despite ex ante announced social benefits 
b1, b2 and b3 > 0 declared by enterprises during the auction. Now, if actual costs were such as 
Cn  < … < Ck  > … <  C3 < C2 < C1, then adverse selection reached its maximum. The latter 
hypothesis corresponds to a reality where the less actually efficient is an investment project, 
the more the enterprise underestimates (hides or cheats about its own inefficiency) its actual 
costs. Such hypothesis was more than realistic in Soviet economies because those enterprises 
submitting the lowest quality investment projects were more eager to cheat (underestimate 
costs) than rival enterprises.  
The conclusion is that when a centralised organisation in a monopoly situation utilises an 
auction to proceed with funds allocation to bidding enterprises, adverse selection is extremely 
likely to appear. And the winner‟s curse is there in. The ministry is cursed in so far as it has 
allocated investment funds to less efficient projects and it will become aware of it when 
enterprises which have benefited from the funds allocation will be unable to complete their 
investment projects at the announced cost within the announced deadline. The state-owned 
enterprise, in some way, is cursed as well: through cheating, it has submitted an infeasible 
investment project and, in practice, it will not be able to complete it within the deadline at ex 
ante announced cost. In the Soviet system, an enterprise which was not correctly fulfilling its 
plan was normally sanctioned (lower bonuses, fewer honorific rewards, dismissal or even 
worse under Stalin). In an attempt to avoid sanctions, enterprises were adding to informational 
cheating some bad management practices (Andreff, 1993) coined as „strategic behaviour‟ in 
standard economic theory
13
. 
When lagging behind its annual investment plan time schedule, an enterprise was attempting 
to bargain an extension of its initial investment fund, allocated at the beginning of the year, 
but which had revealed to be too short due to cost and completion duration underestimation. 
First, it was a bargaining with centralised authorities (ministries) to obtain a facilitating 
revision of its planned objectives: allocation of extra investment fund, extra inputs or 
                                                 
13
 This third variant of the winner‟s curse fits with a public choice approach since the winner is cursed after on 
purpose underestimating/overestimating public investment decisions while in the first one the winner is cursed 
simply due to his/her wrong estimation of the magnitude of oil and gas leases and the interest of exploiting them. 
There is no public choice and no one cursed on purpose in the latter case.  
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manpower, downward revision of plan targets including that the investment project initially 
submitted will not be completed in due time and so on. Big Soviet enterprises had elaborated 
a specific strategy based on tolkachi. A tolkach was an enterprise employee especially 
engaged for staying in Moscow and canvassing tutelage ministries with demands for extra 
investment funds, extra inputs, and downward revision of plan targets. In other words, it was 
the Soviet variant of lobbying. The tolkach had become a quasi-institution, though informal, 
of the Soviet economy and, in some sense, he was a derived product from enterprise winner‟s 
curse. Being cursed by its own cost underestimation strategy, the Soviet enterprise always 
attempted to get extra means for completing its investment project through some pressures on 
and drawing the attention of centralised tutelage authorities.  
Tolkachi were endowed by their enterprise directors with (illicit) secret funds that enabled 
them to bribe those ministry bureaucrats who were likely to deliver extra investment funds 
and extra inputs to the enterprise, to treat enterprise‟s demands as well as those emanating 
from rival enterprises (also cursed during the auction) and to push the enterprise demand files 
up to decision makers in the Kafka-like universe of a Soviet ministry. It was common practice 
that Soviet enterprises were corrupting bureaucrats in charge of allocating investment funds 
and other material means. In a nutshell, in view of avoiding the worst consequence of the 
winner‟s curse consisting in sanctions for plan non-fulfilment, a Soviet enterprise was usually 
resorting to bargaining, lobbying and bribery, the three recipes of a „successful‟ enterprise 
management in a centralised economy with information asymmetry.  
 
3. The Olympics centralised allocation process with asymmetric information 
 
There is a similarity between the centralized auction for allocating investment funds in a CPE 
and how  the auction functions through which the Olympics are allocated to a bidding city. 
However, similar is not identical even though the selection mechanism of a host city 
proceeds, in absence of a genuine market for the Games, with an auction by a (global) 
centralised authority or organisation, i.e. the IOC. From the starting point of the comparison, a 
difference must be underlined. In a CPE, a centralised body offers funds to achieve an 
investment, then opens an auction for investment projects, and finally allocates investment 
funds to various enterprises for projects to be achieved within an annual deadline. With the 
Olympics, the IOC publicises the task of hosting and organising the next Games within a 
precise deadline, then it calls for projects. These projects are not applying  for IOC funding; 
rather, they are candidates to raise funds from different sources in order to cover the cost of 
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those investments required to host the Games. At the end of an auction which usually takes 
several years, the IOC allocates the right to host the Olympics to the most interesting city 
project. However, the fact that the object of such auction is not merely a finance allocated by 
the IOC but the status of being the next hosting city of the Olympics does not reduce or 
eliminate the risk of a winner‟s curse. The risk may be even higher than in a CPE allocation 
process because the incentive to cheat is much stronger. A city which wants to host the Games 
commits itself to heavily invest over a six to seven years span of time and then hopes to 
benefit from the “Olympics host city” label that provides a unique capacity for collecting and 
mobilising finance. The city financial commitment and concern are in the range of billion 
dollars to host the Olympics, whereas, in CPEs, enterprise investment was in the range of 
million roubles, sometimes less.  
Now, considered as an auctioneer, does the IOC behave as a central planner or an industrial 
ministry allocating investment funds when it opens an auction for the next Games? A weak 
variant of a central planner model is due to Oskar Lange (1937) adapting the Walrasian 
auctioneer model. The auctioneer announces some price system, enterprises of the planned 
economy proceed with their economic calculation (profit maximising under a resource 
constraint) and then send back to the planner-auctioneer those output and input quantities that 
maximize their profit. If the quantities supplied and demanded by all enterprises do not 
equalize, the planner revises its price system, then enterprises recalculate their plan projects 
and send newly calculated quantities to the central planner. This iterative process lasts until 
supply-demand equality for all products and resources at equilibrium prices
14
. The auction for 
the Olympics differs from Lange model because the IOC initially does not announce any 
price. Moreover, the IOC explicit or implicit objective is not to reach Walrasian equilibrium 
prices and quantities. 
An inverted planning model to Lange‟s has been suggested namely by Malinvaud (1967), 
Manove (1971) and, for operational planning in Hungary, by Kornaï and Liptak (1965). Here 
the idea is that the planner announces quantities of output to be produced and inputs to be 
allocated and enterprises respond, after their own economic calculation, with prices and costs. 
The iterations go on until they converge toward equilibrium – the saddle point theorem. This 
process is closer to the IOC auction. The IOC, in some sense, announces quantities to be 
produced that is a defined assortment of sporting venues and infrastructure that must be 
completed and operational within the opening ceremony deadline. In addition, each bidding 
                                                 
14
 For a modelling of this iterative process: Andreff (1993).  
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city adds an optional number of non-sporting infrastructure investments, some IOC required, 
that may facilitate or embellish hosting the Games: transportation, high tech 
telecommunications, urban reconstruction, etc. Does the IOC get back prices and costs from 
bidding cities? No. It receives candidature files including both quantities of sporting venues 
and non-sporting infrastructural investments, and costs (prices) of all those investments and 
the LOOC expected organisation costs. To pursue this comparative analysis, objectives of 
respectively the IOC and bidding cities must now be questioned. 
The very existence of the IOC is justified by four responsibilities or objectives, one of which 
being to elect (choose) every fourth year a host city for the Summer Olympics and Winter 
Olympics, and then to supervise its LOOC (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008). Is this 
objective maximized under some constraint as in the auctioneer-planner model? The 
constraint is that a bidding city must provide all the required facilities and must commit itself 
to stick to an operational budget, this is a minimal precondition for a city to be selected. Are 
there other conditions that would maximize the IOC objective function? Another one certainly 
is the best possible quality of the Games which consists of a guarantee of well-functioning 
and secure sports contests (quality of sporting equipment, distance between Olympic venues 
and the Olympic village, etc.), an excellent hosting quality (Olympic village, transportation, 
hotels), overall security, nice opening and closing ceremonies, the quality of media and 
telecommunication and, nowadays, an environmental quality, all prerequisites according to 
the 20 chapters contained in a candidature file. Thus, if the IOC is maximizing something, it is 
the overall quality of the project which must benefit from worldwide media coverage, leave a 
grandiose image of each Olympiad, and an unforgettable memory and indelible marks on the 
host city landscape. In view of obtaining a grandiose project, the IOC interest is to pave the 
way for or even fuel overbidding across bidding cities. This is what it clearly started to do 
after the single candidature of Los Angeles for the 1984 Olympics. 
I intentionally have not mentioned the cost of the Games as one of the variables included in 
the IOC objective function with a background idea of cost minimising. First, it is more than 
likely that the cost of the Olympics is not a decisive criterion in the votes of the 104 IOC 
members. Besides, the criterion of minimal cost to some extent clashes with maximising the 
fantastic quality of the Games that is sought. A proof of such contention is that the IOC often 
selects the most expensive rather than the cheapest project (Table 1), which means both 
adverse selection in terms of cost, and that the winner‟s curse is at work. Afterwards, cost 
inflation and cost overruns are basic indices of the winner‟s curse. 
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The objective function of bidding cities is crystal clear and consists in getting the Games. 
Therefore, each bidding city must promise fixed quantities of sporting facilities and a variable 
quantity of non-sporting infrastructure, focusing on their excellent quality since it will be 
selected or not on these aspects of its candidature. Before Montreal 1976, investment cost and 
the LOOC operational budget did not matter that much. Since then, and after Los Angeles 
1984 demonstrated that the local organizing committee of the Games can end up in the black, 
the cost dimension of candidatures has become much more significant, though not the major 
decision criterion. Bidding cities primary interest is to maximize (and focus on) the qualitative 
components of their candidature, thereby encouraging grandiosity in their project proposal. 
After 1984, bidding cities started to be interested in exhibiting also reasonable or even low 
costs in parallel with the supposedly unbelievable quality of their candidature. The only way 
to reconcile an extravagant project with costs that must not be outrageous is, explicitly or 
implicitly, to cheat, i.e. to communicate and fill the candidature file on the basis of costs that 
are underestimated by different means (omitting the VAT, the Paralympics budget, etc.). All 
in all, it is the bidding cities interest to overbid upward with respect to the quality and 
downward with respect to the publicised cost of their project. Such strategy compares with the 
one of rival enterprises struggling for the allocation of investment funds in a CPE except that 
cities are seeking to get the Games, because it is a precondition for mobilising huge finance 
necessary for  hosting the Olympics. Thus, rival bidding cities are in sync with the principal 
objective of the IOC, which is to balance outward extravagance with the appearance of 
reasonable cost. 
The parallel with enterprises in CPE cannot exactly be extended to the completion duration of 
investments since it was absolutely mandatory, but nearly never met, in Soviet-type planning. 
Yet, the completion duration is mandatory and cannot be circumvented in hosting the 
Olympics - it is not feasible to start up the Olympics sports contests if the stadium is not 
entirely achieved – but the IOC recurrent worries about delayed Olympics building sites can 
be used as a control variable of the winner‟s curse. Building delays usually generate cost 
overruns when it comes to rushing in order to stick to the deadline. Revising building costs 
upwards (thus revealing the initial cost underestimation) or even giving up some Olympics 
building to curb skyrocketing costs are also windfall effects of the winner‟s curse. Another 
revealing factor is when the LOOC or the host city obtains extra finance or extra public 
subsidies, for instance, from the government. A financial deficit or an ex post lower financial 
surplus than expected by the LOOC provides another proof of the winner‟s curse while a 
sanction of the latter is a bidding city budget deficit which must be covered with a specific 
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post-Olympics taxation. Given all the financial consequences of hosting the Games, one can 
understand that bidding cities, just like former Soviet enterprises, do not skimp on the means 
to get the sports event and do not hesitate to engage in lobbying or, in the worst case, in 
corrupting some IOC voters, i.e. the most unscrupulous or greedy members of the IOC.   
A last point is that information asymmetry is crucial in the genesis of the winner‟s curse. A 
bidding city perfectly knows down to the tiniest detail its candidature project so that it is at 
ease to communicate in such a way as to bring out specific aspects of the file, in particular its 
supposedly fabulous quality. In contrast, this in-depth knowledge of the candidature file 
allows the bidding city promoters to keep in the shadow those less exciting characteristics of 
the project namely excess costs, harsh security issues, negative externalities and possible 
crowding out effect. An economic impact study is definitely instrumental to highlight the best 
features and blur the least performing ones. The IOC is not able to reach a similar knowledge 
(information) about each bidding city project and cannot control how much accurate or 
fallacious is the information delivered in the application file, namely about actual costs, 
externalities, etc. The Olympics site visits by the IOC representatives are not enough to 
compensate for information asymmetry between bidding city promoters and the IOC voters. It 
is all the more so that “the IOC members are renowned for not really taking into account the 
technical recommendations and focus on their political and personal judgment of the 
candidatures” (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 87) when they are going to vote.  
 
4. Indicators of the winner’s curse 
 
One can infer from the above analysis some indicators that would enable to spot and check 
the existence of a winner‟s curse resulting from the auction for allocating sporting mega-
events to a host city.  
Indicator 1: Unexpectedly higher net social cost or lower net social benefit 
The most convincing index of a winner‟s curse obviously is a significant difference between 
ex ante and ex post net social outcome of a sporting mega-event that can be observed in 
comparing the results of an ex ante and an ex post cost-benefit analysis of the same event. The 
winner‟s curse hypothesis would be confirmed if ex post net social cost is significantly higher 
than ex ante net social cost or if ex post net social benefit is significantly lower than ex ante 
net social benefit (like with the aforementioned 2007 Rugby World Cup). A significant 
difficulty with indicator 1 is that an ex post cost-benefit analysis usually is not available or 
published after each Olympic Games. Therefore, some proxies are required. The three 
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following indicators are consistent with the winner‟s curse hypothesis although each of them 
alone is not sufficient to definitely establish a curse. However, if they are recurring from one 
Olympics to another (like the recurring cost underestimation of Soviet enterprises), one would 
lean towards the belief that a winner‟s curse is at work in the Olympics allocation to bidding 
cities.  
Indicator 2: Cost overruns 
A first proxy is a recurring difference
15
 between ex ante cost in the candidature file and ex 
post cost reached on the opening day or after. Let us coin it a cost overrun index such as: 
ct-1 < Ct  (or ct-1 < Ct+3 when data is available for Ct+3).  
Given that over a period of six or seven years there is some inflation in any country and that 
upward cost revisions happen at a more or less clearly defined date and are usually published 
in current prices, one can accept as a proof consistent with an existing winner‟s curse a 
difference of at least 30% between ex post actual and ex ante anticipated cost. The data to be 
found are the initial cost in the candidature file in t-1, the actual cost at the moment of the 
opening ceremony Ct and, if one can circumvent data paucity about t+3, the actual cost Ct+3. 
Any extra cost or upward cost revision would fuel relevant data for the cost overrun indicator. 
An additional remark is necessary about this first indicator as well as the next indicators. The 
announced cost ct-1 is an official figure and well publicised by the bidding committee in the 
candidature file and by the IOC. Such ex ante cost is not debatable once published. Looking 
for the actual cost in t or t+3 is obviously less easy and may be cumbersome and boring. 
Indeed, it is not the interest of a host city to unveil that actual cost of the Olympics has 
markedly surpassed ex ante cost. Thus the genuine ex post actual cost is not always much 
publicised in official documents. Then there is sometimes no other way for researchers than 
relying on data published in the press or in documents published without the IOC or the host 
city stamp.  
Indicator 3: Ex post revisions in the Olympics project 
When there is no data about ex post cost, a second proxy can be used when some significant 
revisions occur in the Olympics project between t-1 and t. For example, the emergence of a 
new building in the project which was not included in the candidature file is an explicit index 
of an initial cost underestimation.  Similarly, an upward revision of expenditures linked to one 
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 Olympics cost overruns may have various – including some exogenous (bad weather, overall skyrocketing 
inflation in the host country, etc.) – origins, not to speak of a bad local management of the Olympics project. But 
if cost overruns are so regularly recurring that they appear to be the rule in every Olympics rather than the 
exception, one can conclude that cost overruns are an embedded outcome of a winner‟s curse (like they were in 
the process of allocating investment funds in CPEs).  
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sporting facility or non-sporting infrastructure project between t-1 and t can also reveal the 
existence of a winner‟s curse.  Or, when a building which was forecast in the candidature file 
happens to be cancelled between t-1 and t, this also reveals an initial cost underestimation: 
due to the latter the bill skyrocketed after t-1 and the host city has no other way to curb cost 
overruns than by giving up some edifice described in the candidature file.  
Indicator 4: Delayed completion of an Olympics investment 
The completion dates of different Olympics facilities which are mentioned in the candidature 
file simply cannot be missed. Thus, a delayed completion of an Olympics investment only 
translates into a time lag between expected and actual completion dates, and in a subsequent 
final rush in the last weeks before the opening ceremony to complete the unfinished building 
– by the way it is exactly the investment cycle described for the CPEs (Bauer, 1978). A final 
rush at the very last minute always inflates the actual investment cost. 
When no one of the first three proxy indicators can be fuelled with data or if one wishes to 
further confirm the existence of a winner‟s curse, some other variables can be used as proxies. 
However, they are less significant than the first three indicators. 
Indicator 5: Extra public subsidy or extra public finance 
If the cost of hosting the Olympics was initially underestimated, one way out for the LOOC 
and the host city is to bargain and obtain an additional public finance or an extra subsidy, for 
instance from the government or some regional authorities between t-1 and t. 
Indicator 6: Host city fiscal deficit and debt 
When extra cost of the Olympics project comes out with a heavy financial burden for the host 
city its budget plunges into a fiscal deficit and a public debt that is to be repaid over time. The 
same index may register the transformation of ex ante LOOC (or overall) surplus into ex post 
LOOC (or overall) deficit.  
Indicator 7: A disappointing number of „foreign‟ visitors 
When the number of „foreign‟ (i.e. coming from outside the host city or region) visitors in t is 
lower than expected in t-1, then revenues will be lower than expected and, possibly, will 
increase financial losses. 
Two more qualitative indicators may confirm an existing winner‟s curse: a) there are clear 
signs that a bidding city has attempted to influence the IOC voters through lobbying with 
some IOC members; b) since outcome uncertainty about who will host the Games lasts until 
the IOC votes, and given that some IOC members are less scrupulous and disinterested than 
they should be, a bidding city can be led one step forward into bribery and corruption that can 
be taken as a winner‟s curse confirmation. However, lobbying and corruption per se are not 
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decisive indicators of a winner‟s curse. Lobbying and corruption are unfortunately common 
practices in various economic activities attempting to influence different decision makers, 
including in some rigged relationships between money and sports like fixed matches and on 
line sport gambling (Hill, 2010). Spotting lobbyists, even when lobbying is very effective as 
during the London campaign for the 2012 Olympics (de Rendinger, 2006), is not an easy task 
and does not alone guarantee the existence of a winner‟s curse, except if it is to complement, 
for instance, a cost overrun or a delayed completion indicator. 
 
5. Preliminary indices verifying the winner’s curse hypothesis 
 
The present essay aims to validate the winner‟s curse hypothesis.  Below I sample some 
readily available data on the costs of hosting the Olympics that are consistent with this 
hypothesis. The data gathered in these tables must not be taken at their face value since, as 
mentioned above, some do not bare an official stamp. The only important point here is to 
check whether Ct > ct-1, ex post is higher than ex ante cost, meaning that a cost overrun had 
occurred. Data have been collected, when easily available, for Summer Games since 1972 and 
Winter Games since 1980.  
 
Table 2: Ex ante and ex post cost of Summer Olympics 
    
Host city, year ct-1: ex ante cost Ct: ex post cost After t cost 
(Nb of bidders)    
Munich 1972 Overall cost: $2705m Investment cost: $1757m00  
(4 bidders)  LOOC operation cost: $656m00  
Montreal 1976 Investment cost: $549.5m00 Investment cost: $3395.6m00  
(3 bidders)  LOOC operation cost: $476m00 Operation: $1592m 
 Olympic stadium cost: $172m  Stadium: $1000m 
Moscow 1980 Overall cost: $3.7bn Overall cost: $9bn  
(2 bidders) Operation cost: $2bn   
 Investment cost: $1,7bn   
Los Angeles 1984 No commitment Overall cost: $1592m  
  LOOC operation cost: $546m  
Seoul 1988 Overall cost: $3.1bn LOOC operation cost: $664m00 Extra cost: $2bn 
(2 bidders) Investment cost: $3450m Investment cost: $4063m00  
Barcelona 1992 Investment cost in: Investment cost: $10134m00 Debt: $6.1bn 
(6 bidders) 1985: F13bn; 1988: F23,5bn Overall cost: $9.3bn  
 1990: F35,5bn; 1992: F41,5bn   
 LOOC operation cost: $1670m LOOC operation cost: $1793m00  
Atlanta 1996 Overall cost in 1990: $2021m Investment cost: $1324m00  
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(6 bidders)  LOOC operation cost: $1346m00  
Sydney 2000 Overall cost in 1994: $3428m  Overall cost: $6.6bn 
(5bidders) Investment cost: $2500m Investment cost: $2601m00  
 LOOC operation cost: $1463m LOOC operation cost: $2434m00  
 New South Wales Invt: $1220m New South Wales Invt: $1249m  
Athens 2004 LOOC operation cost: $2162m00 LOOC operation cost: $2404m00  
(5 bidders) Overall cost: €4.6bn Overall cost: €6.0bn (June 2004) Overall: €9.6bn 
Beijing 2008 Investment cost: $1600m00 Investment cost: $2170m00 Invt cost: €13.5bn 
(5 bidders) Invt cost in 2006: $2800m   
 LOOC operation cost: $786m00 LOOC operation cost: $1458m00  
  Infrastructure cost: $35.6bn Infrastr: €29bn 
 Olympic stadium cost: €300m Olympic stadium cost: €380m  
 Overall cost: €2.2bn ($bn1.9bn)  
2004 
Overall cost:$43 to 45bn  
 $2.4bn in 2006   
London 2012 Overall cost: £3.4bn in 2005; Overall in 2011: $19bn (£11.6bn)  
(5 bidders) £3.674bn end 2005; £9.3bn in 2007   
 £10.0bn in 2009   
 Investment in 2005: £2.664bn   
 in 2006: €15.0bn   
 LOOC operation 2005: £1010m   
 in 2006: €1900m   
m: million; bn: billion; $m00: in 2000 dollars; Australian dollars for Sydney; F: French francs  
Sources: Andreff & Nys (2002), Auf der Maur (1976), Barget & Gouguet (2010), Gouguet & Nys (1993), 
Preuss (2004 & 2006), Zimbalist (2010 & 2011), bidding committees, press articles.   
 
Table 3: Ex ante and expost cost of Winter Olympics   
    
Host city, year ct-1: ex ante cost Ct: ex post cost After t cost 
(Nb of bidders)    
Lake Placid 1980 Initial operation cost: $47m LOOC operation cost: $96m Op. loss: $8.5m 
(2 bidders) Investment cost: $129m   
Sarajevo 1984 Operation cost: $17.6m Operaton cost: $20.2m  
(3 bidders)  Investment cost: $15.1m  
Calgary 1988 Initial overall cost: can$500m Overall cost: can$1000m  
(3 bidders)  LOOC operation cost: $636m  
Albertville 1992 Initial total cost: F2933m Overall cost: F12bn Op. loss:$60m 
(7 bidders) in 1987: F3160m; 1991: F11487m  (F285m) 
 of which operation cost: F3233m; LOOC operation cost: F4200m  
 sporting equipments: F714m sporting equipments: F5755m Extra sport equipt  
 infrastructures: F8630m infrastructures: F7800m cost: F286m 
 Accommodation cost: F289m Accommodation cost: F575m  
Lillehammer 1994 Overall cost in 1988: $1511m Overall cost: $1700m Op.loss: $343m 
(4 bidders)    
Nagano 1998 Overall cost in 1992: $450m Overall cost: $875m Debt: $11bn 
(5 bidders)    
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Salt Lake City Operation cost: $400m in 1989; Operation cost: $1.9bn Op. loss: $168m 
2002 (4 bidders) 1996: $1000m; 1998: $1300m   
Turin 2006 Investment cost: €3.5bn Investment cost: €13bn Op. loss: $38m 
(6 bidders) Operation cost: $660m Operation cost: $1357m  
Vancouver 2010 Operation cost: $846m Operation cost: $1269m Op. loss: $37m 
(3 bidders)  Investment cost: €1.31bn  
Sochi 2014 Initial total cost: $8.4bn   
(3 bidders) 2007: $12bn; 2010: $33bn   
m: million; bn: billion; $00: in 2000 dollars; Australian dollars for Sydney; F: French francs; Y: yen 
Sources: Andreff & Nys (2002), Barget & Gouguet (2010), Burton & O'Reilly (2009), Chappelet (2002), 
Elberse et a. (2007), Jeanrenaud (1999), Solberg (2008), Tihi (2003), Zimbalist (2010 & 2011), bidding  
committes, press articles.   
 
Table 4: Summer Olympics: operational and construction cost inecreases   
       
Olympics  Operational cost   Construction cost 
 1st estimation last estimation Increase 1st estimation last estimation Increase 
Munich 1972 1968 1974 222% 1965 1974 171% 
Montreal 1976 1972 1977 538% 1972 1977 385% 
Los Angeles 1984 1981 1984 20% 1983 1984 3.4% 
Seoul 1988 1982 1989 82% 1982 1989 352% 
Barcelona 1992 1988 1993 28% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Atlanta 1996 1989 1997 51% 1989 1997 14% 
Sydney 2000 1993 2001 68% 1990 2001 228% 
Source: Solberg and Preuss (2007).       
 
There is practically no sign of a winner‟s curse involved in Los Angeles 1984, which is an 
expected result since the 1984 Olympics was not auctioned, Los Angeles being the only 
candidate. Nevertheless, it must be reminded that Los Angeles had very little construction 
expense and the city had agreed to host the Games only on the condition that it took on no 
financial obligation (Zimbalist, 2011). In the case of Lake Placid 1980, the second bidding 
city, Vancouver, withdrew a few days before the IOC votes, which may have alleviated the 
winner‟s curse. It has been difficult to find enough information comparing ex ante and ex post 
costs for Munich 1972 so that the conclusion of an existing winner‟s curse still hangs over. 
On the other hand, data are not absolutely reliable for Moscow 1980 and Sarajevo 1984. 
Nearly all other Olympiads show recurring cost overruns consistent with the winner‟s curse 
hypothesis and it is already crystal clear for London 2012 and Sochi 2014 as exhibited in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
With regards to Summer Olympics, without commenting each data per se, Tables 2 and 4 
show a strong tendency of Games ending up with higher ex post actual than ex ante expected 
 25 
cost. It appears that cost underestimation often is more due to investment and infrastructure 
costs than to the LOOC operation cost. If the criterion of a 30% cost overrun in current prices 
is adopted, the winner‟s curse is likely to exist for Montreal 1976, Moscow 1980, Seoul 1988, 
Barcelona 1992, Athens 2004, Beijing 2008, and London 2012. With a 30% extra cost 
criterion the hypothesis is rejected for Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000. In the two latter cases, 
complementary proxies must be meaningful to conclude.  
Turning to Winter Olympics, with the same criterion, a winner‟s curse is recognized for Lake 
Placid 1980, Calgary 1988, Albertville 1992, Salt Lake City 2002, Turin 2006, Vancouver 
2010 and Sochi 2014. On the other hand, complementary indexes are crucial to conclude 
about Lillehammer 1994 and Nagano 1998.  
Looking now at the ex post revisions indicator, it can be witnessed for several Games. The 
most infamous and costly revision probably is the story of the Montreal Olympic stadium roof 
(Auf der Maur, 1976) which eventually had been completed as late as 1985, nine years after 
the Games, at nearly a sixfold increase. Moreover, transforming the velodrome into a 
Biodôme had triggered an additional $1.5 billion cost. In Albertville, the cost of Courchevel 
ski-jump has been revised from $13million up to $26 million, La Plagne bobsleigh run from 
$15 million to $50 million. A $1,346 million expenses targeted at public transportation 
equipment was eliminated from the initial Albertville LOOC budget. In Sydney, two galleries 
of the Homebush Bay stadium were forgone due to excessive cost.. In Beijing, simplifying the 
“Bird‟s Nest” structure of the stadium is a revision that has saved 50% of steel costs; the 
project of Olympic swimming pool, eventually assessed as too sophisticatedly equipped, was 
streamlined. In Vancouver, the security budget multiplied seven times between 2003 and 
2010, from $153 to $1,070 million. The cost of London Olympic stadium has been revised 
upwards from $406 million to $850 million while the cost of infrastructures is up by $170 
million; the Olympic park has inflated by $1,440 million over its initial $5.3 billion bill. Rosa 
Khutor ski resort has been added, after the bid, to Sochi project; it is opportunely financed by 
Interros, a holding company owned by a rich oligarch, Vladimir Potanin.  
Next, consider the delayed completion indicator The Albertville urban project still remains 
uncompleted. The completion delay of the Centenary Park in Atlanta required additional jobs 
and overtime work, and thus has generated extra cost. In Athens, a number of building sites 
had been lagging behind the schedule, in particular the new tramway, a circular motorway and 
a suburban train to the new airport. In January 2004, only one (the Nikaia gymnasium) of the 
33 Olympic sites was ready. Then, the final investment rush occurred. Several London 
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Olympic sites, including Wembley stadium, are late and the LOOC meets increasing 
hindrances to programming all sporting equipments in due time.  
As a result, and as usual with the Olympics, extra public finance and subsidies are obtained 
by the LOOC. Montreal 1976 had got overall $1 billion public subsidies. Albertville 1992 had 
received an extra financial aid from the government in 1987 up to one quarter of the LOOC 
budget, and again a $46 million extra finance after the Games, in July 1992. In Sydney, the 
riding school had obtained an operation subsidy of $676,000 per year and the Blacktown 
Olympic Park $654,000 per year. The city of Athens has never stopped raising public loans 
when preparing to host the Games and helps to account for the increase in Greece public debt. 
The Italian government provided a $223 million to the LOOC in 2005 in order to cope with its 
budget deficit which burst out as early as 2004.  
A LOOC deficit does not emerge as often as it should because extra expenditures are 
transferred to (or subsidised by) the host city budget and sometimes the region or national 
government budget. Nevertheless a loss – an operation deficit – has been registered for 
Munich 1972, Montreal 1976, Lake Placid 1980, Albertville 1992, Lillehammer 1994, Sydney 
2000, Salt Lake City 2002, Athens 2004, Turin 2006, Vancouver 2010, and probably though 
unofficially for Seoul 1988 (Preuss, 2004) and slightly for Atlanta 1996. Given the heavy 
subsidies collected by Barcelona 1992 (and a subsequent $6.1 billion debt), the $3 million 
official financial surplus is practically fictitious. Lake Placid deficit also was not officially 
that visible since it had immediately been covered by an exceptional aid from the New York 
state.  
As a consequence, money is taken out of the taxpayer pocket. The debt of Montreal 1976 was 
reimbursed by taxpayers through an extra local tax ($176 million) and a Québec provincial 
special taxation on tobacco ($480 million). Moreover, running Montreal Olympic sporting 
facilities has created a $13 million annual deficit over 35 years. The city of Barcelona budget 
had to charge $1.7 billion repayment on to the taxpayers. The deficit of Albertville LOOC has 
reached $60 million and the city‟s debt was $2,400 per inhabitant; it has been financed by a 
4% increase of the local housing tax. Several municipalities of the Tarentaise valley, which 
hosted the Albertville Games, such as Pralognan, Brides-les-Bains, Macôt, Les Saisies and 
Courchevel were also indebted. Sydney Games eventually generated a $168 million debt. 
New South Wales pays $37.3 million per year to operate former Olympic sites
16
. The 
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 A related issue is that some Olympic facilities are no longer used (in particular ski jumps and bobsleigh runs) 
after the Games. However, it is not a proof of the winner‟s curse per se since the non use is due to a short (or non 
existing) local demand for such facilities though they are absolutely required by the IOC.  
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Australia stadium had not been financed by issuing shares on the stock exchange and is in 
financial disarray, and running the Superdome and the water sports centre are in the red. It is 
estimated that Greek taxpayers will pay for the Games deficit until 2030. 
On the Olympics revenues side there are less determinants of the winner‟s curse than on the 
costs side. One is ex ante overestimation of the number of visitors attracted by the Games, in 
particular foreign visitors. For instance, in Albertville, a substantial share of the printed 
800,000 tickets went unsold. One fourth of Atlanta tickets were left unsold. The number of 
visitors at the Sydney Games was lower than predicted (Preuss, 2004). However, one cannot 
find a major source of the winner‟s curse in missing or lost revenues. 
If, by chance, it were not possible to find any sign of lobbying and corruption during the 
Olympics bids, then we would have a good counterfactual to the winner‟s curse hypothesis. 
But lobbying has seemingly become an almost unavoidable strategy to win the Olympics bid. 
Lobbying has a cost though often unknown (of course unpublicised). In a few cases, some 
information has filtered through the press: Sydney has lobbied and paid about $0.5 million 
honoraries to overbid Beijing for the 2000 Games. Just before the votes for allocating the 
2008 Games, Beijing committed itself to build ten stadiums in African countries to win over 
some IOC members from that continent. London also adopted aggressive marketing and 
lobbying tactics whose effect is considered by some as a major determinant of its winning bid 
for 2012. De Rendinger (2006) describes in detail the sequencing of London lobbying 
“technology”: first hunting, then farming, then convincing, then closing, and eventually 
controlling (some future votes); he mentions that Paris 2012 candidature did not follow a 
similar strategy. Moreover, London had opportunely offered $24 million to aid sport 
participants of poor countries if it would win the bid. Such strategy of course has been called 
into question in the French press asking whether the IOC has not turned itself into a lobby
17
.  
With regards to corruption, the Sheridan report published in 1999 has established that Sydney 
2000 bribed VIPs to become the Olympics host city. In September 1993, right before the IOC 
votes, the Australian Olympic Committee had offered $65,000 to two IOC members, 
representatives of Kenya and Uganda. A peak in corrupting the bid has been reached with Salt 
Lake City Olympics (Maennig, 2002 & 2005) so that the rules of the Games allocation have 
been emended. Unveiling naked corruption has triggered a reform of the IOC (Chappelet and 
Kübler-Mabbott, 2008) and the exclusion of several IOC members such as Augustin Arroyo 
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 S. Cypel, Londres l‟a emporté grâce à un lobbying efficace auprès du CIO, sensible à ses promesses, Le 
Monde, 8 juillet 2005 (London has won thanks to an efficient lobbying by the IOC which is sensitive to its 
promises).  
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(Ecuador), Zein el-Abdin Gadir (Sudan), Sergio Santander Fantini (Chile), Jean-Claude 
Ganga (Congo), Lamine Keita (Mali), Paul Wallwork (Samoa) in 1999 while the infamous 
Kim Un-yong (South Korea), a former IOC deputy president, has been blamed in 1999 and 
eventually resigned in 2005, under strong pressure. In fact, illicit embezzlements and bribes 
had already occurred in 1991 when Nagano won the bid over Salt Lake City for the 1998 
Winter Olympics. At nearly the same date, some suspicions have weighed on Robert 
Helmick, a former president of the swimming International Federation and the architect of 
Atlanta victory for 1996. According to Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, Seoul winning the bid 
over Nagano for the 1988 Summer Games had also been plagued with special favours granted 
to some IOC members
18
. 
However, to end up with a less pessimistic note, it must be noticed that in the most recent bids 
(namely for the 2018 Winter Olympics), the IOC attempts to fight the cost underestimation. 
Each and every investment has to be mentioned and financing has to be secured. Calculations 
are both in US$ and local currency and the IOC asks a decent position of bidding cities for 
miscellaneous and unexpected costs. The outcome of such IOC effort in terms of alleviating 
the winner‟s curse remains to be seen in the future. 
 
Conclusion  
It is not feasible to verify the winner‟s curse as an outcome of all Summer Olympics and 
Winter Olympics bids. However, cost overruns, project revisions, delayed completion, 
financial deficit and debt are so much widespread that it is enough to conclude that the 
winner‟s curse is more the rule than the exception. In particular, cost overruns are observed 
most Games sampled in this chapter. The only host city which at first sight was absolutely not 
cursed, Los Angeles 1984, is precisely the only one which had not to overbid rival cities, 
because it was the only one candidate right after the financial mess of Montreal 1976.  
From this derives a policy recommendation: to avoid cost overruns and other bad 
consequences of the winner‟s curse, there should no longer be an allocation of the Olympics 
through auctioning. If someone would materialise such recommendation, the suggested 
practical reform is to fix once and for all a site for the Olympics (from time to time the Greek 
city of Olympia is mentioned as the proper site), which will avoid any auctioning, 
overbidding and winner‟s curse. However, it is not the interest of the IOC to have just one 
                                                 
18
 Bribing an IOC member may pertain to other sporting mega-events than the Olympics. The press recently 
alleged that Issa Hayatou, the Cameroon‟s IOC member, took $1.5 million bribe to vote for Qatar to host the 
2022 FIFA World Cup.  
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candidate or always the same (Olympia) since the bid winner – host city – being cursed, and 
paying the bill for providing magnificent but expensive Games,  is the easiest means for the 
IOC not to pay the actual price for having its sports mega-event hosted.  
 
 
 
 
References: 
 
Akerlof G. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 89, 488-500. 
Allmers S. & W. Maennig (2009), South Africa: Economic Scope and Limits, in N.J. Rao & A.S. Sidoya, eds., 
Economics of Sports, Ifcai University Press, 186-213. 
Andreff W. (1991), dir., Les effets d'entraînement des Jeux Olympiques d'Albertville: Retombées socio-
économiques et innovations dans le domaine du sport en région Rhône Alpes, PPSH 15, CNRS, Lyon & 
Grenoble. 
Andreff W. (1993), La crise des économies socialistes. La rupture d‟un système, Grenoble : Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble.  
Andreff W. (2000), Privatisation and Corporate Governance in Transition Countries: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, in: E.F. Rosenbaum, F. Bönker, H.-J. Wagener, eds., Privatization, Corporate Governance and 
the Emergence of Markets, London : Macmillan, 123-38. 
Andreff W. (2003), Twenty Lessons from the Experience of Privatisation in Transition Economies, in: Y. 
Kalyuzhnova, W. Andreff, eds., Privatization and Structural Change in Transition Economies, London : 
Palgrave, 29-59.  
Baade R. & V. Matheson (2001), Home Run or Wild Pitch? Assessing the Economic Impact of MLB‟ All Star 
Game, Journal of Sports Economics, 2, 307-27. 
Barget E. & J.-J. Gouguet (2010), Evènemens sportifs. Impacts économique et social, Bruxelles: De Boeck. 
Bauer T. (1978), Investment Cycles in Planned Economies, Acta Oeconomica, 21, 243-60.  
Burton R. &N. O‟Reilly (2009), Consider Intangibles when Weighing Olympic Host City Benefits, Sports 
Business Journal, September, 7-13.  
Capen E., R. Clapp & W. Campbell (1971), Competitive Bidding in High-risk Situations, Journal of Petroleum 
Technology, 23, 641-53. 
Chappelet J.-L. (2002), From Lake Placid to Salt Lake City: The Incredible Growth of the Olympic Winter 
Games since 1980, IDHEAP, Lausanne.  
Chappelet J.-L. & B. Kübler-Mabbott (2008), The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System, 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Cassing J. & R.W. Douglas (1980), Implications of the Auction Mechanism in Baseball‟s Free Agent Draft, 
Southern Economic Journal, 47, 110-21.  
De Rendinger A. (2006), Jeux perdus. Paris 2012,, pari gâché, Paris: Fayard. 
 30 
Du Plessis S. & W. Maennig (2009), South Africa 2010 : Initial Dreams and Sobering Economic Perspectives, in 
U. Pillay, R. Tomlison & O. Bass, eds., Development and Dreams. The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football 
World Cup, Capetown : HSRC Press, 55-75. 
Dyker D. (1983), The Process of Investment in the Soviet Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Elberse A., C. Anthony & J. Callahan (2007), The Vancouver Olympics, Harvard Business, October.  
ESSEC (2007), Les retombées économiques de la Coupe du Monde de rugby 2007 en France, Etude pour le 
Comité d‟organisation France 2007, April 27.   
Feddersen A., W. Maennig & P. Zimmermann (2008), The Empirics of Key Factors in the Success of Bids for 
Olympic Games, Revue d‟Economie Politique, 118, 171-87. 
Gilberto S. & N. Varaiya (1989), The Winner‟s Curse and the Bidder Competition in Acquisitions: Evidence 
from Failed Bank Auctions, Journal of Finance, 44, 59-75. 
Gilley O., G. Karels & R. Leone (1986), Uncertainty, Experience and the Winner‟s Curse in OCS Lease 
Bidding, Management Science, 32, 673-82.  
Hill D. (2009), How Gambling Corruptors Fix Football Matches, European Sport Management Quarterly, 9, 
411-32. 
Hudson I. (2001), The Use and Misuse of Economic Impact Analysis, Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 25, 20-
39. 
Johnson B.K., Groothuis P.A., Whitehead J.C. (2001), The Value of Public Goods Generated by a Major League 
Sports Team, Journal of Sports Economics, 2, 6-21.  
Kagel J.H. & D. Levin (2002), Common Value Auctions and the Winner‟s Curse, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Késenne S. (2005), Do We Need an Economic Impact Study or a Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Sport Event, 
European Sport Management Quarterly, 5, 133-42. 
Kornaï J. (1980), The Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. 
Kornaï J. & Liptak T. (1965), Two-level Planning, Econometrica, 33, 141-69. 
Lange O. (1936, 1937), On the Economic Theory of Socialism, Review of Economic Studies, 4 (1, 2), 53-71, 
123-42. 
Leeds M. & P. von Allmen (2002), The Economics of Sports, Boston: Addison Wesley.  
Levis M. (1990), The Winner‟s Curse Problem, Interest Costs and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 
Economic Journal, 100, 76-89.  
Maennig W. (2002), On the Economics of Doping and Corruption, Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 61-89. 
Maennig W. (2005), Corruption in International Sports and Sports Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and 
Countermeasures, European Sport Management Quarterly, 2, 187-225.  
Malinvaud E. (1967), Decentralized Procedures for Planning, in E. Malinvaud & M.O.L. Bacharach, eds., 
Activity Analysis in the Theory of Growth and Planning, London : MacMillan, 170-208. 
Manove M. (1971), A Model of Soviet-type Economic Planning, American Economic Review, 61, 390-406..  
Matheson V. (2009), Economic Multipliers and Mega-Event Analysis, International Journal of Sport Finance, 4, 
63-70. 
Neuberger E. (1959), The Yugoslav Investment Auctions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 73, 116-30.  
 31 
Porter P. (1999), Mega-sports Events as Municipal Investments: A Critique of Impact Analysis, in: J. Fiszel, E. 
Gustafson & L. Hadley, eds., Sports Economics: Current Research, Westport: Praeger, 61-74. 
Rock K. (1986), Why New Issues Are Underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 187-212.  
Solberg H.A. (2008), Impacts from mega events: What do we know so far?, Trondheim Business School, 
September 30. 
Solberg H.A.  & H. Preuss (2007), Why mega sports events become more expensive than planned, EASM 
conference presentation.  
Swindell D. & M.S. Rosentraub (2002), Negotiating Games: Cities, Sports, and the Winner‟s Curse, Journal of 
Sport Management, 16, 18-35.  
Tihi B. (1983), XIV Zimske Olimpijske Igre kao factor razvoja Sarajevskog regiona, Bosne I Hercegovine I sire 
zajednice, Eknonomski Institut, Sarajevo.  
Walker M. & M.J. Mondello (2007), Moving Beyond Economic Impact: A Closer Look at the Contingent 
Valuation Method, International Journal of Sport Finance, 2, 149-60 
Walton H., A. Longo & P. Dawson (2008), A Contingent Evaluation of the 2012 London Olympic Games, 
Journal Sports Economics, 9, 304-17.  
Zimbalist A. (2010), Is It Worth It? Hosting the Olympic Games and Other Mega Sporting Events is an Honor 
Many Countries Aspire to – But Why?, Finance & Development, March. 
Zimbalist A. (2011), Economic Impact of the Olympic Games, in S.N. Durlauf & L.E. Blume, eds., The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online.  
 
